with diagnosed primary malignant brain tumors. Four years and more than a million dollars later, these studies were stopped before it was possible to determine the effectiveness of antineoplastons. Both NCI and Dr Burzynski, the developer of antineoplastons, accused one another of attempting to undermine the project. In an effort to determine why this study failed to be completed, the director of the National Institutes of Health Office of Alternative Medicine (OAM), who sponsored the study, commissioned a detailed analysis of the conflicts that led to the study's closure. The intent was to understand the social dynamics surrounding this failed study and to develop a method for managing and possibly preventing such failures in the future. This clinical trial was extremely complex and comprehensive. It involved hundreds of memoranda, letters, and telephone and fax correspondence among a wide number of parties over a 4-year period. All correspondence and other documents from the OAM as well as documentation from NCI were thoroughly examined. In addition, in-depth interviews with key individuals involved in the antineoplaston study were completed and incorporated into the analysis. At least 10 areas of conflict emerged from the analysis including issues around production, quality, and deliver y of antineoplastons; commencement of the trial; the role of Dr Burzynski in the trial; types and combinations of cancers; choice of clinical investigators; need for communication; criteria for patient selection and treatment; and evaluation. Each of these issues clearly represented a difference of opinion between the 2 main parties around scientific protocols. Yet contention around these substantive, "scientific" disagreements reflected conflict in attunement (trust, power, and affiliation) between Dr Burzynski and NCI. This article summarizes the findings from this case study.
In this issue, Integrative Cancer Therapies publishes an update from several case series of the controversial cancer treatment called antineoplastons, reported by Dr Stanislaw Burzynski. As in the past reports by Dr Burzynski, this report claims remarkable results from antineoplastons in hundreds of individuals with aggressive and advanced cancers. It is a sad commentary on our scientific community that it is now more than a decade since the National Cancer Institute (NCI) attempted to validate the claims of Dr Burzynski without successfully completing the study or resolving the issue of its efficacy. And thus, we still ask the question: Are these effects real?
This current update by Dr Burzynski may feed the fire of controversy, but it will not help patients faced with critical decisions who have cancer. If Dr Burzynski's claims are true, we continue to fail thousands of patients by not verifying these claims and, if valid, using this therapy. If these claims are not true, we are subjecting hundreds of other patients to the anxiety, costs, and possibly neglect by not knowing if they are making good choices by taking this therapy.
We are focused on why NCI's attempts to verify Dr Burzynski's claims failed. And why have they and others such as the National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine (NCCAM) not made further attempts to independently investigate these claims? It is our belief that the reasons have to do with how controversy in science is managed and how the social aspects of science can undermine the goals of science in controversial areas.
Controversy in science is ubiquitous, and for concepts included within the socially acceptable boundaries of debate, it is resolved through discussion, debate, publication, peer review, and funding decisions by those who manage scientific knowledge. For concepts that lie outside those boundaries, conven-tional science and medicine usually handle controversies by ignoring them or restricting discussion in conferences, allowing publication only of certain perspectives and limiting research resources in those areas. Until recently, the area of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) was outside these boundaries. With the creation of the NCCAM and its predecessor, the Office of Alternative Medicine (OAM), an attempt has been made to bring CAM into the process of mainstream science.
However, many areas of CAM remain too controversial to address, even by those agencies designated to investigate them. Part of the reason these areas are not investigated is that those agencies have not developed systems for the management of social conflict in science. Failure to properly manage the social conflict in CAM research can undermine attempts at researching CAM therapies. This is especially prominent for alternative cancer treatments in which emotions and claims run high. In this article, we summarize a detailed investigation into the conflict that undermined the NCI attempt to verify Dr Burzynski's claims and discuss how such failures to manage the social process in controversial areas might be addressed in the future.
From December 1991 to December 1995, NCI initiated phase II clinical trials of A10 and AS2-1 (antineoplastons) infusions in patients with diagnosed primary malignant brain tumors. This effort was undertaken with the cooperation of the OAM at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and Dr Stanislaw Burzynski, the developer of the antineoplaston treatment. The effort at research on antineoplastons occurred after numerous case reports of successful treatment of several cancer types by Dr Burzynski. A team from NCI and OAM traveled to Dr Burzynski's clinic in Houston, Texas, and evaluated several dozen records for accuracy of diagnosis, type of treatment, and patient response. Members of this team felt there was sufficient preliminary evidence from these cases to warrant a formal prospective study of the safety and efficacy of antineoplastons in 2 types of aggressive cancer, glioblastoma and astrocytoma. These studies were developed with Dr Burzynski as a consultant and initiated at the Mayo Clinic and Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New York. Four years and almost a million dollars later, these studies were stopped before it was possible to determine the effectiveness of antineoplastons. Both NCI and Dr Buryzinski accused the other of attempting to undermine the project.
In an effort to determine why this study failed to be completed, the OAM director (W.B.J.) commissioned the first author of this article to perform a detailed investigation of the conflict dynamics that led to the closure of the study. The goals were to understand the social dynamics surrounding this failed study and to develop a method for managing and possibly preventing such events in the future. In addition to a detailed study of antineoplastons, the OAM organized a series of meetings and a report to specifically evaluate and develop a system for the management of social conflict in controversial CAM areas. The purpose of that report was to summarize findings from the detailed case study completed on the antineoplaston clinical trial.* This clinical trial was extremely complex and comprehensive, involving hundreds of memos, letters, and telephone and fax correspondence among a wide number of parties over a 4-year period. § All correspondence and other documents from the OAM as well as documentation from NCI were thoroughly examined. In addition, in-depth interviews with key individuals involved in the antineoplaston study were completed and incorporated into the analysis.
Social Management: A Conceptual Framework
Two fundamental features of conflict are directly relevant to the conduct of research on controversial topics. First, conflict involves important incompatibilities among contending parties. 1 As Rubin et al suggested, conflict involves a "divergence of interest, or a belief that the parties' current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously." 22(p5) A second element of conflict involves perceived interference by one or more parties in the goalseeking capability of the other. 3, 4 As Fisher emphasizes, conflict interference reflects "attempts by the parties to control each other, and antagonistic feelings by the parties toward each other." 5(p6) Perceived incompatible goals coupled with interference comprise 2 core aspects of a conflict dynamic that can arise in research studies of controversial topics. It is precisely these conflict elements that often lead to contentious (win/ lose) behavior between parties. 6 The conceptual framework used in this case study of the antineoplaston clinical trial is best characterized as a social management approach that is grounded in an examination of the functional meaning of interaction that takes place under conditions of disagreement and emotional intensity. [7] [8] [9] This social management approach has its intellectual origin in interactional communication theory [10] [11] [12] and identifies 4 conflict domains that frame communication, understanding, decision making, and behavior among parties. These 4 frames interactionally function as "flash points" for conflict escalation and de-escalation. The first frame is substantive issues, or the objective goals/ wants of each party. Divergent goals often become the landscape on which the parties express their disagreements with one another. The second frame is that of attunement. Attunement is concerned with relational issues around trust, power, and affiliation. The third frame is identity or face. Face reflects the need of each party to have their self-image validated in interaction with the other. When conflict arises around face needs, the sensitivity of each party is enhanced toward perceived threats directed at each other's reputation or professional self-image. The final, core frame is that of emotion. Negative emotions often arise when substantive disagreements emerge, relational trust is questioned, and face is attacked. This can produce a level of emotional distress that can lead to contentiousness among 1 or more of the parties.
The process for conducting scientific research is comfortably grounded in the notion that substantive disagreements or issues are tested through the application of scientific methods. It is through appropriate research design and implementation that findings obtained from such efforts achieve a satisfactory level of "interpretive" agreement within the scientific community, thus providing direction for further research activity. In essence, researchers place great reliance on shared understanding of scientific methods as the metaframework for coordinating research efforts and developing new knowledge.
Research on controversial topics, however, is often fraught with substantive disagreements that are not easily resolved through reliance solely on more objective, scientific methods. Issues that interfere with the conduct and success of scientific investigation on controversial topics are often found not in the science but rather in the human arenas of relational mistrust, perceived threats to one's reputation or professional stature, and strong, negative emotions. This often leads to various interpretive and judgment biases that reflect selective filtering and recall of incoming data, dismissal of nonconforming data, increased mistrust of the motives of the other party, reduced ability to empathize with the other, simplified thinking, and overreliance on prior expectations/experiences. 7, 13 The antineoplaston study conducted by NCI is, unfortunately, a tragic example of how ineffective social management processes escalated conflict between the parties, resulting in a termination of the research effort.
Summary of the Burzynski Case Analysis
There were a total of 30 specific substantive disagreements identified. These substantive disagreements or issues clustered into 10 categories. The first set of issues arose between October 1992 and November 1993 and centered on the production, quality, and delivery of antineoplaston. Conflict emerged between Dr Burzynski and NCI around the issue of when and whether Dr Burzynski would be able to provide the antineoplaston in a timely manner and with sufficient quality assurance. This substantive issue was highly charged, reflecting relational mistrust (low attunement) such that NCI indicated they would obtain the drug from other sources if Dr Burzynski was unable to provide the antineoplastons in a timely manner. Dr Burzynski links this issue to other issues concerning changes in the protocol that he wished to be made. After 1 year, the issue of timely delivery of the antineoplastons was resolved only after Dr Burzynski received assurances from NCI concerning modifications to the protocol. At that point, arrangements were made to ship the antineoplastons to NCI.
A second issue category focused on the commencement of NCI trial. This issue was initiated by Dr Burzynski in December 1992 and reflected strong disapproval of what Dr Burzynski characterized as a wasted 8-month delay in initiating the trial. This issue reflected growing mistrust between NCI and Dr Burzynski. Dr Burzynski charged that NCI may have been postponing the trial to permit Texas authorities to put him out of business, thus affording NCI a reason to not conduct the clinical trials. Specifically, Dr Burzynski expressed his frustration with NCI's "delay" due to NCI's lack of the investigational new drug (IND) application in a timely manner. This issue was de facto resolved with the schedule of the trials remaining within the domain of NCI.
A third issue concerned the role of Dr Burzynski in the trial. This was a contentious, ongoing issue that was never resolved to Dr Burzynski's satisfaction. Essentially, Dr Burzynski felt his role in the study included active consultation and consent to specific protocols while Dr Friedman from NCI felt Dr Burzynski was inappropriate in attempting to dictate to NCI how the clinical trial would be conducted. This issue, perhaps more than any other, directly involved face attack behavior between Dr Burzynski and NCI officials. For example, Dr Burzynski felt his reputation as the developer of the antineoplaston therapy was insulted by NCI in communiqués from Dr Friedman and legal representatives from the NIH suggesting that consent from Dr Burzynski was not needed and that the trials of the antineoplaston rested entirely with the investigators and NCI. Similarly, Dr Burzynski's demand to be actively involved and consulted by NCI was interpreted as a face attack message by Dr Friedman around his (and NCI's) capability to carry out a fair and impartial study. Other parties such as Frank Wiewel asserted their support for Dr Burzynski and fanned the flames of conflict by introducing past condemnations of NCI studies of similar substances as a pattern of separating the person from his or her medicine. This issue continued throughout the 4 years of the study and strongly affected the relationship between Dr Burzynski and NCI. The issue was de facto resolved with NCI maintaining its initial control and influence over the trial.
A fourth issue concerned the types and combinations of cancers. One specific topic concerned the inclusion/exclusion of childhood cancers in the trials. The position of the NCI was that children should be excluded from the trials. Dr Burzynski believed good success in antineoplaston therapy is achieved in children. A second topic concerned the testing of antineoplastons with 2 different brain cancers, glioblastoma multiforme (GM) and anaplastic astrocytoma (AA). In April 1993, for example, Dr Burzynski argued that protocol T93-0078 deviated from the guidelines established by the NCI's Decision Network in December 1991 by combining 2 projected trials into 1. The NCI suggested there was no evidence to support the contention that response rates to antineoplastons differ between the 2 grades of malignancy. Furthermore, Dr Friedman explained that the study as written had accrual to each stratum proceeding independently and each stratum would be analyzed separately. Again, mistrust underlies this disagreement as Dr Burzynski suggested that should the first group have more patients with GM, and given his assertion that this type of malignancy is more difficult to treat, it would be easy for NCI to conclude that antineoplastons do not have therapeutic effect. Both issues were resolved de facto by NCI not including childhood cancers in the clinical trial and NCI separating patients with GM and patients with AA into 2 strata for analysis.
A fifth issue dealt with most directly in 1993 was the choice of clinical investigators. A decision was made by NCI to use Memorial Sloan-Kettering and Mayo Clinic principal investigators in the trial. Clearly reflecting a high level of mistrust, both Mr Wiewel and Dr Burzynski contended that Memorial Sloan-Kettering and Mayo Clinic had a history of bias against alternative treatments and antineoplaston therapy specifically. NCI responded that none of the investiga-tors had expressed a position for or against antineoplastons and that both institutions had a distinguished record in clinical studies. This issue was resolved when NCI proceeded with Sloan-Kettering and Mayo Clinic as principal investigators.
A sixth issue focused on the need for communication. One topic that arose concerned Dr Burzynski's request for clinical trials monitoring printouts from the studies to be sent to him every 2 weeks. NCI stated they would be sent on a monthly basis. This was resolved de facto by NCI sending the printouts on a monthly basis. A second communication-related topic concerned the request by NCI for Dr Burzynski to provide data supporting his contention that patients with large tumors do not respond well to the NCI protocol. Dr Burzynski stated he had already provided such information. This issue was not resolved. A third topic involved Dr Burzynski's request for individual patient records of the first 5 patients treated in the trial. NCI claimed monthly clinical summaries had been sent to Dr Burzynski by a contractor, Theradex. This issue was resolved de facto by NCI not sending (as they claimed they did not have in their possession) any patient records to Dr Burzynski. A fourth topic concerned Dr Burzynski's claim that the informational "Cancernet Fact Sheet" of NCI contained false information about the antineoplaston trial. NCI did not apparently respond. This issue was de facto resolved by NCI maintaining its original fact sheet. While each of these issues appear to be rather easily managed, they are indicative of the relational "push and pull" that existed between NCI and Dr Burzynski. For Dr Burzynski, these communication issues confirmed his deep-seated distrust of the motivation of NCI and its implementation of the study protocols, while NCI viewed these issues as indicative of inappropriate requests from Dr Burzynski in the course of the clinical trial.
A seventh issue arose around patient criteria. One specific topic concerned the inclusion of patients with large tumors. This issue emerged early in the study and reemerged near the end of the study related to whether to expand patient eligibility criteria. Dr Burzynski first suggested that patients with large tumors should not be included in the protocol and then later asserted that the protocol had been changed. NCI maintained that the protocol was followed and not violated. These issues were not resolved. The lack of resolution concerning the expansion of the eligibility criteria resulted finally in the termination of the trials.
A third topic concerned inclusion criteria for patients based on age. Dr Burzynski suggested that patients between the ages of 18 and 60 years be included, while NCI countered that excluding patients older than 60 years could not be legally accomplished. This issue was de facto resolved by NCI maintaining that legally, age could not be used to exclude patients. A fourth topic arose concerning the proper protocol for low-grade gliomas. This issue appeared to be de facto resolved by NCI maintaining its original protocol. A fifth topic concerned the number of patients in the study. Dr Burzynski asserted that a total of 35 patients were agreed on while NCI stated there should be a total of 70 patients. This issue was resolved by NCI inviting the Mayo Clinic to join the Sloan-Kettering study rather than conduct an independent trial. This solution would limit accrual to 35 patients, per Dr Burzynski's request. Overall, these specific issues demonstrated again the power struggle that emerged between Dr Burzynski and NCI in the establishment of patient criteria as well as appropriate modifications of these criteria.
An eighth issue focused on treatment criteria. One specific topic concerned the duration of therapy after date of complete response. Dr Burzynski contended that patients should continue treatment 8 months after the date of complete response while NCI maintained that patients should continue treatment 3 months after the date of complete response. This issue was de facto resolved by NCI maintaining treatment for the 3-month period. A second topic was addressed by Dr Burzynski in terms of recommending that dosages be lowered for patients who were receiving antineoplastons in continuous infusions for low-grade gliomas. He also recommended a different adult-level dosage. In this case, NCI agreed to Dr Burzynski's dosage modifications. Yet again, these issues were imbedded with tension and conflict, reflecting relational mistrust.
A ninth issue concerned evaluation criteria. One topic initiated by Dr Burzynski concerned the timing of patient evaluation. Dr Burzynski believed evaluation should be conducted after treatment of each group of 5 patients rather than waiting for 14 patients to be gathered and treated-the recommendation of NCI. This issue was resolved by NCI arranging a review of data after the accrual of the first 5 to 6 patients, apparently meeting Dr Burzynski's concern. A second topic concerned the criteria for continuation of the study. Dr Burzynski claimed Sloan-Kettering included more stringent than usual criteria for response evaluation, while NCI countered that there was little reason to change the criteria for continuing the study. This issue was resolved by NCI agreeing to Dr Burzynski's request. A third topic concerned the timing of prestudy patient evaluation. Dr Burzynski asserted patient radiologic evaluation should be conducted 1 week rather than 2 weeks prior to the patient's entry to the study, while NCI argued to maintain the standard clinical trials methodology used to evaluate new agents. This issue was resolved by NCI agreeing to Dr Burzynski's request and changing the protocol to 1 week. A fourth topic concerned the measurement of patients' performance status. Dr Burzynski recommended that patients' performance status should be 70% to 100% Karnofsky. NCI asserted that a Karnofsky performance status of 60% was sufficient. This issue was resolved by NCI acceding to Dr Burzynski's request, changing eligibility criteria to accept patients with a Karnofsky performance status of 70% to 100%. A fifth topic concerned NCI's revised protocol of the use of neurologic function as an additional criterion to determine patient response as appropriate. Dr Burzynski asserted this was not an appropriate criterion as some patients would have experienced chemotherapy or radiation therapy and may already have experienced neurological deterioration prior to the antineoplaston treatment. This issue was resolved by NCI eliminating neurological status as a criterion. A sixth issue concerned an assertion by Dr Burzynski that NCI violated the protocols. NCI disputed this and stated that the Mayo Clinic and Sloan-Kettering trials were conducted consistent with the agreed on protocols. This issue was not resolved.
A 10th area includes other issues. One topic that arose concerned payment to Dr Burzynski for the production of the antineoplastons. It is not clear how this issue was resolved. A second topic concerned Dr Burzynski's doubts about the fairness of Theradex in determining if the study followed protocol guidelines. This was resolved de facto as the trial proceeded with Theradex as the contractor. A third topic concerned NCI's assertion that Dr Burzynski refrained from telling patients that the pediatric trial of anti-neoplastons (another study) was associated with NCI. Dr Burzynski denied this assertion. This issue was not resolved.
Each of these 10 issues clearly represents a difference of opinion between the parties concerning scientific protocols. Yet contention around these substantive, "scientific" disagreements reflected conflict primarily in attunement (trust, power, and affiliation) between Dr Burzynski and NCI. Overall, positive statements of liking, concern, or respect were lacking between the parties. While clearly the need to maintain objectivity on the part of NCI was paramount, positive feedback for suggestions made by Dr Burzynski (even when those suggestions were accepted by the NCI) was noticeably absent. Similarly, there was a general lack of positive communication emanating from Dr Burzynski toward NCI.
Discussion
One of the more important clinical trials of an alternative cancer treatment was never completed. The primary explanation appears to be that both parties treated their interaction difficulties primarily in terms of scientific disagreements rather than recognizing that deeper incompatibilities existed around attunement (ie, relational trust), face (ie, each party's need to have their self-image validated by the other), and strong, negative emotions. Because of this, even though objective progress and agreements had been made concerning the many substantive issues that divided the 2 main parties, the perception that the trial was deteriorating grew to the point that both parties mutually agreed to terminate the study. Again, the perception that the trial was deteriorating and would not or could not be completed because of the actions of the other party is based on escalating conflict around attunement (power and trust) and face or identity (reputation) issues that were never addressed by either party. This produced a spiral in conflict escalation, where the subsequent actions of each party were interpreted as a deliberate attempt to sabotage the clinical trial, discredit the reputation of the other, and/or demonstrate disrespect and mistrust toward the other party. All of this occurred within an emotional atmosphere of frustration, anger, and hostility.
Under these escalating conflict conditions, working relations became irrevocably strained, and fundamental questioning of one another's motives emerged. Interviews with some of the key players involved in this conflict reveal a clear pattern of interpretation whereby little sensitivity and understanding of each other existed. The supporters of Dr Burzynski suggest NCI's motive for conducting the trial as a deliberate attempt to discredit antineoplaston therapy specifically and Dr Burzynski more generally, while supporters of the NCI claim deliberate deception enacted by Dr Burzynski and a motivation of Dr Burzynski to not have the trial succeed. The latter was presumably because it would be in his own best interests for the NCI to fail in its effort to test in a rigorous, scientific manner the efficacy of antineoplaston therapy.
For instance, there was a substantive disagreement between Dr Burzynski and NCI concerning the timing/delay of 1 year in the commencement of the trial. This issue was initiated by Dr Burzynski and was framed by him in terms of an assumption that NCI may be deliberately postponing the trials to sabotage the study to harm Dr Burzynski. NCI's position was that Dr Burzynski simply did not adequately understand the complexities of initiating a phase II clinical trial and was disrespectful toward NCI. NCI felt offended at this affront to its own self-image (identity) as a fair, impartial institute of scientific inquiry. The important point of this example is that there is very little if any data to support either of these perceptions. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that NCI was taking various actions to move the trial forward and Dr Burzynski, due to his many years in working on various INDs, was not ignorant of the complex NIH trial design process. The assessments of both parties, therefore, reflect social judgment biases that created further relational mistrust and tarnish reputations.
This case demonstrates the important role social management can play in research conducted on controversial topics. To date, antineoplaston therapy has not yet been tested within the NIH structure. The need to do so is perhaps even more compelling. Should another clinical trial be attempted, it is imperative that social management practices be included in the study in the same rigorous manner as scientific protocols. Without effective social management protocols incorporated into these types of high-visibility studies, conflict can emerge that will likely mitigate the best intentions of the researchers.
Can explicit social management practices in science help rigorous research in controversial areas be accomplished? We think they can. Following this analysis of the failed NCI antineoplastons study, the OAM commissioned a series of meetings to outline and then develop a method of social management of research in controversial areas. These meetings resulted in an extensive report and set of recommendations by several of the world's experts in conflict management. 13, 14 The procedures developed from these meetings have been successfully tested in another controversial area of science (digital biology) for the Department of Defense. 15 We believe these guidelines deserve further refinement and application in other areas of controversial research both in CAM and conventional topics.
Conclusions
Physicians and scientists are human and as such are subject to all the bias, prejudices, irrationality, and manipulation to which humans are prone. When an environment is emotionally charged, the normal attempts at cultivating objectivity that is a purported hallmark of science can be completely undermined by these human faults. Alternative therapies, especially those used in the treatment of cancer, are often such an environment. Without an explicit attempt to understand and manage the social dynamics of science in these circumstances, their probability of failure is high. While each party in an unmanaged conflict may save face and lay claim to integrity, it is patients who ul-timately suffer from lack of accurate and unbiased information on which to base treatment decisions. As the public becomes more demanding that scientists examine areas that fall outside of the boundaries of their usual domains, it behooves scientists to make these investigations as fair and objective as possible by acknowledging and explicitly managing the social aspects of the scientific process. Further development of guidelines for the social management of research in controversial areas is needed.
